A Deep Dive into A Shallow Pool
- James Prendamano
- 8 hours ago
- 37 min read
A solution-based report on how to deliver water to farmers and the communities downstream, establish a minimum pool in Elephant Butte Lake, restore hydropower and recreation, keep New Mexico compliant with the compact, and deliver economic relief across Sierra County and the state — with a clear accounting of the cost of continued inaction.
By James Prendamano
Owner, PreReal Investments · Elephant Butte, New MexicoBoard Member, Spaceport America · Sierra County
Revised August 2026 · Prepared for the leaders and constituents of New Mexico
A working brief for the Governor of New Mexico and her staff, the Office of the State Engineer, the Interstate Stream Commission, the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, the Elephant Butte Irrigation District, the congressional & Senate delegation, local leaders and elected officials — and everyone whose livelihood depends on this water: farmers, ratepayers, business owners, and the people of New Mexico.
THE BOTTOM LINE
Diligence, not advocacy
I am not a hydrologist and I am not going to pretend to be one. I am an operator. I have spent my career underwriting deals, and the first thing you learn underwriting anything is that the story people tell you and the numbers on the page are usually two different things. You do the diligence yourself, or you get taken.
I have built a real estate portfolio I am proud of, and a significant number of holdings — including my home — are in Sierra County: a place I fell in love with, the people, the nature, and the opportunity to deliver hope and inspiration to the incredible hard-working folks of this state. I sit on the board at Spaceport America. I have watched the lake that anchors this county drop to a cracked bowl while confident people explained why nothing could be done. So I did what I do with any deal: I pulled the file, checked every claim, and threw out the ones that did not hold up — including several I badly wanted to be true.
Since the first version of this file, two things changed the ground under the argument, and both make the case stronger. First, the decades-long Compact fight with Texas is over — the Supreme Court entered the final Consent Decree on May 26, 2026.² New Mexico now operates under a court-enforced delivery discipline below Elephant Butte. The Environmental Assessment on the Low Flow Conveyance Channel is completed, resulting in immediately actionable steps that dramatically improve water-delivery solutions. Second, I have since personally walked and documented the San Acacia reach that feeds this lake and read the federal record on it end to end. What I found is that significant amounts of the water this lake is missing are being lost, predictably and avoidably, in the seventy miles above Elephant Butte Dam — to invasive vegetation in and around a conveyance channel left largely unmanaged along its length, inside an unnecessarily complicated, antiquated ownership and management system.
My bottom line up front — message to leaders:
Elephant Butte is empty today in large part because of how we operate, store, and account for water in the reach above Elephant Butte Dam — not solely because the sky stopped delivering it. That is good news, because operations and accounting are things the State can change. The single biggest block of recoverable water is not litigated, not speculative, and not waiting on Congress — it is upstream, it is already funded in part, and it needs the State to lead. We do not need a new act of Congress. We need the decision to act.
I will be sharing this brief widely, because the people it affects deserve to see it. My hope is that we build the solution together.
The drought is real. It is not why the lake is at 1.4%.
As of August 10, 2026, Elephant Butte held about 1.4% of capacity — roughly 27,000 acre-feet, its lowest level since the early 1970s.¹ A rainfall problem corrects itself in a good year. This one has not — because the thing keeping water out of the lake is not the sky. It is a rule.
Look at two years back to back. In 2023, New Mexico had its 18th-driest year on record — statewide precipitation ran about 21% below normal — and Elephant Butte more than doubled, from roughly 225,000 to 466,000 acre-feet.³⁹ Then in 2024, rainfall came back to near normal — about 93% of average statewide, and 99 to 100% across every headwater basin that feeds the lake — and the lake fell by about 60%, from 466,000 back down to 186,000 acre-feet.³⁹
A dry year filled the lake. A normal year emptied it. If rainfall drove this reservoir, those two years would be reversed. That is the difference between weather and plumbing: weather we cannot control; how we move, store, and account for water we can.
Rainfall and snowpack came in near or above normal in most of these years; lake storage did not follow. Sources: NOAA NCEI Climate at a Glance (statewide precipitation); NRCS Water Supply Outlook Reports (headwater snowpack); Water Data for Texas / TWDB (Elephant Butte storage).
Why a good year still cannot refill the lake
The mechanism is not a mystery. In 2024 the headwater snowpack that feeds this lake came in at or near normal, yet New Mexico ended the year carrying an accrued Rio Grande Compact debit of roughly 124,000 acre-feet — water it owed downstream and, under the Compact, could not keep in upstream storage. The mechanism is Article VII of the 1938 Compact: whenever usable Project storage in Elephant Butte and Caballo falls below 400,000 acre-feet, New Mexico may not add to post-1929 storage in the upstream reservoirs — and in 2024 that trigger was in effect from late June through year-end.⁴⁰ The water was there. The rule sent it past the lake.
The settlement ended the lawsuit. It did not touch this rule.
The May 2026 Consent Decree governs how water is apportioned below the dam. Article VII, which governs storage above it, stands exactly as written; the decree does not amend it and states plainly that it “does not alter the Compact rights and obligations of the signatory States.”
So the interstate excuse is gone — but the one rule still standing between a good snow year and a fuller lake is a 1938 emergency backstop now firing six to twelve months a year. How New Mexico answers that rule is not a problem for Congress or the courts — it is a decision for the State.
None of this denies the drought. The point is narrower and harder to argue with: even when the snow and the rain come back, how New Mexico operates — not the weather — decides whether the lake refills, or whether we watch another good year run past us to a reservoir stuck near empty.
WHERE THE WATER IS
Five moves, ranked by water recovered and time lost
The San Acacia reach above Elephant Butte is where a practical response begins. The ranking below is deliberately short: each line is an action; the proof, limits, and responsible parties follow in its true home.
1 · Reclaim the reach Take title to the San Acacia channel from a willing federal partner, clear and deepen it, remove invasives end-to-end, and fund upkeep through MRGCD; the defensible net gain is tens of thousands of acre-feet a year.¹¹
2 · Lock in delivery Once the State funds the reach and takes title, write a binding Elephant Butte delivery covenant into the State's management agreement with MRGCD — a floor the State controls, not a federal permit.
3 · Request restitution Respectfully ask the federal government to make New Mexico’s farmers, residents, and all those affected by shortage whole for the water held short of the lake at the LFCC outfall — on the order of 100,000 acre-feet, vested at Elephant Butte.⁹
4 · Establish the pool Use existing Reclamation operating-agreement precedent and Elephant Butte pool space; no new federal statute is the starting premise.²⁰
5 · Manage steady flow Run the system steady in, steady out: year-round throughput keeps the turbines generating, recaptures the water 25 miles downstream at Caballo, and shortens the time each acre-foot sits exposed to evaporation.³⁵
LEVER 1 · THE BIGGEST BLOCK OF RECOVERABLE WATER
Reclaim the San Acacia channel
If the question is where to recover the most water for the least money and the least litigation, start in the San Acacia reach. This is not a wish list of separate projects — it is one coordinated move: take title to the Low Flow Conveyance Channel, clear and deepen it, remove the invasive vegetation along the entire stretch, and fund its upkeep through the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District. Each piece reinforces the others. A deeper, cleared, natively-vegetated channel under permanent local management is a channel that finally delivers water to the lake instead of losing it.
The ownership question is no longer the wall
Salt cedar and Russian olive occupy long stretches between the diversion dam and Elephant Butte, consuming water year-round before a farmer, a reservoir, or a wildlife manager gets to decide what that water should do. Fixing that has always run into one objection — the channel is federal, so nothing can happen fast. That objection no longer holds. The federal government is a willing partner: it is moving to dispose of this facility through title transfer, and a streamlined administrative process to expedite that transfer is currently being finalized. This is the path the State should seize now — the Interstate Stream Commission and the Office of the State Engineer put the transfer in their budget and champion it, and MRGCD takes the reach under its management plan. The State’s preferred posture is ownership with MRGCD as operating partner, backed by funding agreements so the district is never forced to carry the reach alone.
The net-recoverable math
The published riparian-ET literature supports salt cedar consumptive use around 4.2 acre-feet per acre per year, against a native-vegetation target of roughly 2.8–3.3.¹¹ Across a managed reach of approximately 25,000–30,000 riparian acres, gross consumption is very large. But gross consumption is not what can responsibly be counted as recovered water.
This initiative alone: roughly 37,500 to 45,000 acre-feet per year.
Clearing an acre does not recover all 4.2 acre-feet; native vegetation still uses water. The defensible gain is a net figure — about 1.5 acre-feet per acre per year, drawn from OpenET and field ET data as the corridor returns to a native patchwork. Across 25,000 to 30,000 managed acres, that is a net recovery of roughly 37,500 to 45,000 acre-feet every year — water that can be sent down the river, the conveyance channel, and into the lake.
For scale: that is more water, every single year, than the 27,000 acre-feet in the lake today — its lowest level since 1971. One maintenance practice, scaled across one reach, recovers more than the lake's entire current storage — and it needs no new dam, no new compact, and no wet winter to deliver it.
And this figure is deliberately conservative — because it counts only one reach, and only the water we choose to go after. The 37,500 to 45,000 acre-feet above reflects the San Acacia corridor alone. The water is physically there; what is missing is funding and the decision to act. Salt cedar and invasive vegetation choke riparian corridors across New Mexico — picture the water a coordinated, statewide reclamation effort could return, not just to Elephant Butte but to every New Mexican who depends on this water. One reach is the proof of concept. The state is the opportunity.¹², ¹⁹
The environmental review is done. It is time to act.
After years of study, the environmental assessment authorizing monsoon-flow operations is complete. The engineering is understood — clear, deepen, restore, and maintain — and the cost to do it fast is roughly $25 million. Against a State that holds more than $70 billion in permanent-fund and investment assets, that is a rounding error.⁴⁴ The money is not the obstacle, and neither is the knowledge. The federal partner is willing, the district is ready to manage the reach, and the transfer process is being finalized.¹⁴, ¹⁵ Every piece is in place except one: a decision by the State to fund the work and take title. The only thing still missing is the will to act — and there is no honest reason left to treat a $25 million fix to a structural water crisis as if it were optional.
LEVER 2 · THE ENFORCEABLE COUPLING
Re-operate the channel and write the delivery rule into the management agreement
Lever 1 reduces loss. Lever 2 makes the downstream result enforceable rather than aspirational — and it does so through an instrument the State controls outright. This does not wait on a federal decision, and it gives no one an excuse to wait. When the State funds the work and takes title, the State writes the delivery obligation into its own management agreement with the district. The action, the money, and the enforceable result all sit in State hands.
The reach and the mechanism
The Low Flow Conveyance Channel (LFCC) was built to move water south more efficiently than the aggraded river, with a nominal design capacity of roughly 2,000 cubic feet per second.⁴⁷ Reclamation identifies losses from invasive vegetation, seepage, and summer drying.⁹ The environmental assessment authorizing monsoon-flow operations in the reach is complete — a real step in the right direction. Seasonal re-operation can begin now, and it should: get that water moving immediately, without waiting on the larger realignment study still underway.⁴⁵
Reclamation’s own LSARI project manager describes the realignment’s benefit as delivering “tens of thousands more acre-feet” to Elephant Butte.¹⁹ But do not stop there. That authorization covers only ephemeral monsoon flows — a fraction of what a channel built for 2,000 cubic feet per second can deliver. To put meaningful water in the lake, the State must demand that MRGCD be given the authority to operate the channel year-round, not just in storm season. The physical fix is not in doubt. What has been missing is a binding commitment that the water this work frees up actually reaches the lake, year after year, rather than being lost or quietly diverted along the way.
The single most important commitment in this brief:
The State should fund the district to perform both the initial emergency clean-up and the year-to-year management of the reach — roughly $25 million for the upfront work, plus a recurring annual maintenance appropriation. In return, the management agreement must contain a binding delivery covenant: that this work enables the district to deliver no less than 37,500 acre-feet per year to Elephant Butte, measured as water recovered through this initiative and conveyed down the LFCC.
The covenant must be written so the minimum counts only net-new water attributable to the funded work, measured against a documented pre-project baseline. Water drawn from any other source, or flows that would have arrived anyway, do not count toward the minimum. This closes the obvious loophole — the State is buying recovered water from this reach, not a paper number the district could satisfy by reshuffling supply.
Where title and the delivery rule meet
MRGCD assumed LFCC operations and maintenance on August 1, 2021, while title has remained federal, with changes in operation needing written United States authorization.¹⁶ Historically, title to reserved Reclamation works has stayed federal absent an act of Congress or a title-transfer statute.¹⁷ What has changed is the federal posture: the transfer is now moving on the streamlined administrative footing described in Lever 1. That is what makes the delivery covenant possible: once the State holds title and funds the reach, the delivery obligation lives in the State’s management agreement with the district — not in a federal permit the State cannot control. Ownership makes the reach durable; the funded management agreement makes the result enforceable. Neither waits on Washington.
LEVER 3 · FEDERAL ACCOUNTABILITY
They held the water back for twenty years — and the habitat died anyway
Here is what happened just above the reservoir, in plain sight. As Elephant Butte dropped toward empty, the conveyance channel’s water ponded into a marsh above the reservoir instead of reaching the lake — and it went on that way for roughly two decades, water sitting short of Elephant Butte where the State had every interest in seeing it delivered.
The justification was endangered-species habitat: the pooled water fed a wetland used by the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, which Reclamation’s own Biological Assessment describes as habitat “provided primarily by the outfall of the Low Flow Conveyance Channel.”⁹ Eventually Reclamation built a controlled outfall to drain that ponded water at River Mile 60 back toward the river and on to Elephant Butte — and when it operated, the water moved downstream toward the lake where it was always supposed to go.¹⁸ It is hard to argue the water belonged in that marsh after you build the structure to send it to the lake instead.
Then · July 2024 / Now · 2026
And look at what two decades of that operation bought. The habitat it was all meant to protect is gone anyway — dried to cracked flats the moment the water stopped. The water never reached the lake, and the marsh did not survive either. Twenty years of a river’s water, held back for a wetland that no longer exists.
Conservatively, that is on the order of 5,000 acre-feet a year — roughly 100,000 acre-feet held short of Elephant Butte over the life of the diversion.
Make it right:
The federal government should make New Mexico whole for the water held back — on the order of 100,000 acre-feet — vested at Elephant Butte and split to create two wins:
50,000 acre-feet dedicated to the Elephant Butte minimum pool — the permanent floor that protects the lake economy.
50,000 acre-feet vested at Elephant Butte to work down New Mexico’s accrued Compact debit — real relief on a debt that stood near 124,000 acre-feet, against the 200,000-acre-foot accrued-debit ceiling the Compact sets.⁴⁰
One act of restitution. A protected pool, and real breathing room on the Compact.
LEVER 4 · THE POOL
Build a protected pool on authority that already exists
More delivery needs a legal bucket. The important starting point is that a minimum or conservation pool at a federal reservoir can be established through an operating agreement; it does not begin with a request for a new act of Congress.
The precedents
Abiquiu, New Mexico (2013): a permanent 30,000-acre-foot environmental pool through a settlement agreement, not new legislation.²¹
Box Butte, Nebraska: a minimum fisheries pool by three-party operating agreement.²²
Flaming Gorge: minimum releases for a fishery through operating agreement.²³
General authority: the Federal Water Project Recreation Act supports reservoir operation for recreation and fish-and-wildlife enhancement, with non-federal cost-sharing.²⁴
The pool at Elephant Butte is not a proposal — it already exists
Here is the fact that should end the argument. Congress did not just authorize a pool somewhere; in 1974 it created a 50,000-acre-foot recreation pool at Elephant Butte itself under PL 93-493 §1401. That pool space was never repealed. What expired — after ten years — was only the funding mechanism: the annual Heron releases that were meant to top the pool off for evaporation. The space is still on the books today.²⁰
“It takes an act of Congress” — the wall every Elephant Butte argument dies on — is false.
Congress already dug this pool: 50,000 acre-feet, authorized in 1974. Only the ten-year evaporation funding expired — the space did not. Reclamation confirms it in its own operating plan. The pool does not need to be created. It needs to be filled.
And New Mexico now has the water to fill it. The federal restitution owed under Lever 3 — roughly 50,000 acre-feet for the water held short of the lake, vested at Elephant Butte — is exactly the volume of this authorized pool. The pool Congress already built, filled with water the federal government already owes. One act of restitution turns an empty authorization into a standing floor.
That is not our characterization — it is Reclamation’s. Its Elephant Butte Five-Year Operational Plan states, in plain words, that “the minimum recreational pool space still exists, and legally, a SJ-C contractor could still move its water to the pool.”⁴¹ The container is built.
And who keeps it full? A pool loses water to evaporation, so the 1974 law paired the fill with a modest annual top-off — up to 6,000 acre-feet a year of Heron releases — to hold the level. That top-off funding ran for ten years and lapsed in 1984. The State can restore it without a single vote in Congress. New Mexico already leases San Juan–Chama water for exactly this kind of purpose through its Strategic Water Reserve, which the Interstate Stream Commission may use to lease water from willing sellers to meet compact and species obligations; the State has, for instance, leased about 20,000 acre-feet a year from the Jicarilla Apache Nation.⁴⁶ Restoring a roughly 6,000-acre-foot annual top-off is a small fraction of what the State already leases — and storing purchased San Juan–Chama water at Elephant Butte for recreation is separately authorized by PL 97-140 (1981), the same authority the City of Albuquerque used to contract for 50,000 acre-feet of storage here in 1983, a contract still in force and under renewal.²⁰ The federal top-off that expired in 1984 simply becomes a State-funded top-off today. The space, the fill, and the top-off all exist; the remaining work is an operating agreement among Reclamation, the State, the districts, and partners.
What this pool does — and what it does not:
San Juan–Chama water is imported Colorado-basin water, so Reclamation counts it as non-Project Storage. That means a recreation pool refills the lake for recreation, hydropower head, and the fishery — but it does not by itself lift the Article VII 400,000-acre-foot brake, and pool water is first to spill in a spill year.⁴¹ And San Juan–Chama supply is itself drought-sensitive: a full allocation has come only three years in the last ten.⁴⁶
That is precisely why the restitution water, not the lease, builds the floor — the lease only tops off evaporation, a job it can do even in lean years because the pool is already full. Filling the lake and releasing the compact brake are two different fixes. This lever delivers the first. It is still the fastest water New Mexico can legally put back into Elephant Butte.
A ten percent floor, kept in motion
This is not a call for a full lake today. It is what the community has rallied behind and is now demanding: a 10% minimum pool — roughly 200,000 acre-feet against a capacity near 2.0 million — held as a floor and paired with steady, year-round releases through the conveyance channel. Ten percent is deliberate. It is roughly seven times today’s storage, yet it sits far below the level of usable Project storage that governs a compact stored-water call, so it does not disturb the compact math.³⁴ It is a floor with room above it to negotiate — not a ceiling.
The case for pairing that floor with steady throughput is physical, and it favors New Mexico. Evaporation is a surface phenomenon: the water lost to the sky equals the evaporation rate times the exposed surface area. A near-empty reservoir spread thin across a wide, shallow bed is the worst possible shape — maximum surface, minimum depth, maximum loss per acre-foot stored. Elephant Butte loses roughly 10 vertical feet of water a year off its surface; at a full pool that is about 140,000 acre-feet a year, and in a typical year the lake still loses on the order of 100,000 acre-feet — more than the entire annual municipal use of the City of Albuquerque. Every one of those acre-feet counts against New Mexico’s compact allocation and reaches no farm, no turbine, and no downstream obligation.³⁴
And the container itself is permanently smaller than it was: Elephant Butte has lost more than 600,000 acre-feet of its original storage capacity — over a fifth of the reservoir — to sediment deposited since 1916, a loss no wet year reverses.²⁵
Steady in, steady out — the water you move is the water you keep.
Water held stagnant in a wide shallow pool is water waiting to evaporate. Water moved steadily through the system is water put to work before the sky can take it. Every acre-foot released for hydropower at Elephant Butte is recaptured 25 miles downstream at Caballo and stored for irrigation — the plant was engineered as a flow-through system precisely so releasing water does not waste it.³⁵
Steady managed flow therefore does three jobs at once: it keeps the turbines generating year-round, it delivers reliably to farms and to Texas, and it shortens the time each acre-foot sits exposed in the pool.
A protected 10% floor and steady throughput are not in tension — they reinforce each other. The floor keeps the working pool deep and compact instead of thin and sprawling, which lowers the percentage lost to evaporation; the throughput keeps water earning its keep on the way to storage. Steady in, steady out.
The audience below the dam.
There is a second constituency that lives with the same problem from the other side. The day the gates close, the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte and Caballo goes dry — the river flows only during the irrigation-release window and is otherwise a bare channel for most of the year.⁴² The reach is so reliably dry that a temporary dam is placed below the lake to hold what little water remains, then pulled and rebuilt around each release.⁴³
This lever answers them, too. The same steady, year-round throughput that shortens evaporative exposure in the pool is the flow that keeps the channel below the dam alive instead of empty. It is not a call to release more water — it is a call to manage the water already moving so it serves the reach downstream as well as the lake upstream. The people who want a living river below the dam and the people who want a fuller lake above it are asking for the same management, not competing for the same acre-foot.
Conservation has to mean this lake too
A minimum pool is not only about acre-feet and turbines. It is about a functioning lake. The constant, deep drawdown that comes with releasing storage on an irrigation calendar is hard on the ecology, and the harm is well documented. Nest-spawning fish — largemouth bass most of all — need a stable water level during the spring and early-summer spawn. When the level falls through that window, spawning beds built in shallow water are left high and dry, the eggs die, and an entire year-class can be lost. The strongest bass year-classes show up in years when the pool holds at or above its spring level; hatching succeeds when the level is steady and is disrupted by rapid rises and drops.³⁶
This is not a fishing-club theory. It is a conflict the State already manages around: New Mexico Game & Fish keeps voluntary off-limits spawning coves in May and June and has worked directly with the Bureau of Reclamation to soften the impact of water releases during the spawn — and the State keeps re-stocking the lake, roughly a million largemouth fry in a single stretch of May 2026 alone, paid for out of license revenue.³⁷ A protected minimum pool with steady, managed flow does structurally what those workarounds attempt by hand: it holds the spawning shelf in place instead of pulling the water out from under it every spring.
WHY NOW · THE COST OF AN EMPTY LAKE
The cost of an empty lake
The lake did not just get low. It took the economy down with it. In August 2026 Elephant Butte sits at about 1.4% of capacity — roughly 27,000 acre-feet, its lowest level since 1971 — and the water has pulled back so far that it has left cracked lakebed, stranded navigation markers, and debris that sat underwater for half a century. The state representative for this district calls it “an economic catastrophe for my community… also an environmental catastrophe.” That is not rhetoric. It is the plain description of what a receding lake does to the towns built around it.³⁸
When the water leaves, the season leaves with it.
The recreation economy is the first thing to feel a shrinking lake, and it is already breaking. With the reservoir at about 1.4% of capacity, New Mexico State Parks closed the main Elephant Butte boat ramp — with South Monticello and Rock Canyon already closed — and waived all camping fees through September 30, the kind of step a park takes when the normal season is gone. When the ramp closes, the guided trips and tournaments that depend on trailered boats stop with it.³⁸
The damage is landing on the town's books. The Mayor of Elephant Butte reports fewer tourists, weekend homeowners leaving for other lakes, and the hit falling squarely on gross-receipts tax — the community's core revenue — and he is now actively pursuing emergency relief funds for local small businesses. Recreational fishing alone is about a $267 million activity supporting some 3,136 jobs statewide, and a healthy Elephant Butte is where a large share of that value is supposed to live. A stable pool protects the fish, the guides, and the towns in one move.³⁸
Tourism and agriculture
Elephant Butte Lake was New Mexico's most-visited state park in FY2024, with 924,791 visitors — roughly 17.5% of state-park visitation. Sierra County state parks generated an estimated $124.5 million in output and supported about 1,216 jobs; recreation use value was $92.3 million, down from $101 million in FY2019.³ At about 1.4% and 27,000 acre-feet, the lake now holds a small fraction of the 180,000 to 200,000 acre-foot minimum pool that Sierra County's own 2017 Comprehensive Plan identifies as necessary to sustain the regional recreation economy.³²
The Rio Grande Project supports roughly 159,650 authorized acres. Doña Ana County recorded $320.6 million in direct farm sales in the 2022 USDA Census, making it New Mexico's leading crop county and the nation's leading pecan county.⁵ Low storage shifts farmers toward groundwater, and the settlement requires New Mexico to retire depletions on a fixed schedule.⁸ Recovering upstream water is therefore an agricultural and taxpayer issue, not only a lake issue.
Two signature crops, one shared dependence on this water
New Mexico's two most recognizable crops both live or die on Rio Grande Project water, and both trace back to this lake. Pecans are now the state's largest agricultural export: New Mexico produced roughly 84.8 million pounds valued at about $167 million in 2024, ranking it the nation's top pecan producer, with Doña Ana County alone accounting for roughly $108 million and the largest pecan acreage of any county in the United States.⁵ Chile — the crop stapled to New Mexico's identity, from Hatch to the official state question — added about $52 million in 2024 on some 8,000 acres, and every dollar of chile sold generates close to $1.45 in total economic activity across processing, restaurants, and tourism.⁵
Chile built New Mexico's identity. Mismanagement is taking it acre by acre.
New Mexico chile has collapsed from roughly 34,000 acres in the 1990s to about 8,000 to 9,000 today — a nearly 75% decline — and the growers and universities that study it name water availability as a primary driver, alongside labor. This is not a crop failing on its own. It is a signature New Mexico industry being squeezed out acre by acre because the water it was built on has become unreliable. Every year the lake sits near empty is another year of chile ground that does not come back.
The whole economy runs through this water
The numbers above are not isolated line items. Put them side by side and the scale of what depends on this water becomes clear — and so does what is already slipping away.
Power, drinking water, and the county's margin
Elephant Butte is a roughly 24-megawatt federal hydropower facility,⁶ and its output falls as storage drops: less head means less power. In the low-storage years the plant generated only about 15 to 18 million kilowatt-hours — roughly half its recent five-year average of 34.7 million — the same shrinking pool that Lever 4 would protect on authority that already exists.²⁶ Low water does not threaten the dam itself: a lower pool means less load on a concrete gravity structure, which is why the funding path here is Aging Infrastructure and WaterSMART, not Dam Safety. And while Elephant Butte hydropower sits outside the Renewable Portfolio Standard, it counts toward New Mexico's 2045 zero-carbon Clean Energy Standard.²⁸ Downstream, the Mesilla Valley aquifer supplies Las Cruces and is recharged by Project releases; the cited record describes a 26-foot water-table decline and cumulative depletion of roughly 2.5 million acre-feet.²⁶ Sierra County also relies on recreation and quality of life to compete for residents and employers.²⁹, ³⁰
THE COMPACT
“We can't act — Texas is suing” is over
The lawsuit is no longer a reason to defer operational work. The Supreme Court entered the final Consent Decree in Texas v. New Mexico & Colorado on May 26, 2026; the Special Master was discharged and the case dismissed.²
The decree governs the division of Project water below Elephant Butte between New Mexico and Texas on the roughly 57/43 split. It sets accrued-departure limits of 150,000 acre-feet in the first five years and 120,000 thereafter; the remedy is operational, not monetary.² New Mexico also faces scheduled groundwater-depletion reductions, with about 18,200 acre-feet a year phased in and half due by 2031.⁸ In that setting, water avoided upstream is water the State does not have to replace through farm fallowing or idled wells.
Read the record, not the rumor:
There is no annual “New Mexico owes Texas 790,000 acre-feet” debt; 790,000 is a release/index parameter, not a yearly bill. The decree also creates no third-party beneficiaries. The pool must rest on its own authority, and the State's upstream work must stand on its own operational value.²
CORRECTING THE RECORD
A quick-reference record
“The lake is low because of drought.” Drought matters, but in 2017, 2019, 2023, and 2024 headwater snowpack ran from about 109% up to 141% of median and the lake still peaked at only about 30% full or less. Operations are part of the problem.
“We can't act — Texas is suing us.” Over. The final Consent Decree was entered May 26, 2026; New Mexico operates within a settled, court-enforced framework.
“New Mexico owes Texas 790,000 AF a year.” No. It is a release/index parameter, not an annual debt. The decree's remedy is operational, not monetary.
“The settlement created a pool.” No. It creates no third-party beneficiaries. A pool rests on existing reservoir authority and an operating agreement.
“This all needs an act of Congress.” No. Both pieces move without new federal legislation. A minimum pool rests on existing reservoir authority and an operating agreement — Abiquiu, Box Butte, and Flaming Gorge show the pathway. And the LFCC does not require a new act of Congress to secure: the State funds the reach, receives title through the administrative transfer the federal government is already advancing, and writes the delivery covenant into its own management agreement with MRGCD.
“Invasive removal only recovers 37,500–45,000 AF/yr.” That range is the estimate for this one managed reach alone — the San Acacia corridor between the diversion dam and Elephant Butte. As we recapture that ~45,000 AF here, a statewide invasive-removal initiative across New Mexico’s river corridors would save an incalculable volume of water, year after year, for every resident.
“The fishery is fine; just keep stocking.” Stocking can't outrun a falling spring pool. Nest-spawning bass need a stable level or the eggs strand and die — which is why the State already works around release timing. A minimum pool fixes the cause.
WHAT I'M ASKING FOR
Seven sequenced asks
Concrete, matched to the office that can act, and ordered by the window that closes first.
1. Write a binding delivery covenant into the MRGCD management agreement.
Fund the district for the initial clean-up and year-to-year management, and require in return no less than 37,500 acre-feet per year of net-new water delivered to Elephant Butte down the LFCC, measured against a documented baseline.
Who acts: Governor · Legislature · OSE · ISC · MRGCD
2. Fund and scale invasive-vegetation removal in the San Acacia reach.
Match existing federal work with sustained State funding to restore native cover and capture the defensible net savings.
Who acts: Governor · Legislature · ISC · MRGCD
3. Recognize storage-for-conservation as a beneficial use.
Make the state-law recognition needed for a protected conservation pool.
Who acts: State Engineer · Legislature · ISC
4. Negotiate a minimum-pool operating agreement — a 10% floor.
Convene Reclamation, the State, EBID, MRGCD, and partners around existing Elephant Butte pool space and a lawful water source, holding a 10% (~200,000 AF) minimum pool.
Who acts: Reclamation · State · EBID · MRGCD
5. Request restitution for water held short of the lake.
For roughly two decades the LFCC outfall pooled water into a federally created marsh instead of the reservoir — on the order of 100,000 acre-feet. Respectfully ask the federal government to make New Mexico whole, vested at Elephant Butte: 50,000 to the minimum pool, 50,000 vested to work down the accrued Compact debit.
Who acts: Governor · OSE · ISC · Reclamation · USFWS
6. Direct infrastructure and sediment funding here.
Use Aging Infrastructure and WaterSMART tools for Elephant Butte and San Acacia, following the federal sediment template.
Who acts: Delegation · Reclamation
7. Manage for steady flow — steady in, steady out.
Deliver steady year-round throughput for hydropower and delivery while minimizing evaporative loss and protecting the spring spawn; make ESA compliance, the fishery, and reservoir storage complementary objectives, not competing narratives.
Who acts: All operators
In closing
I came to this as an operator: I pulled the record, kept the facts that survive scrutiny, and focused on the decisions that can move water. The lawsuit is settled. Upstream recovery can be scaled. A delivery rule can be written now. A pool can be negotiated on authority that already exists.
The question is no longer whether New Mexico can identify a path. It can. The question is whether its leaders will take the actions in sequence, measure the result, and adjust in public. I am ready to help make that case with you.
— James Prendamano, Elephant Butte, New Mexico
APPENDIX · THE UNDERLYING DATA
Appendix: the numbers behind the argument
This appendix backstops the two claims that carry the most weight: that good snow years did not refill the lake, and that clearing invasive vegetation in one reach recovers tens of thousands of acre-feet a year. Every figure here is traceable to a primary source in the endnotes.
A. Snowpack vs. lake fill — the full record
The chart in the body shows four recent above-normal snow years. The longer record tells the same story: across a quarter century, wet winters and dry winters alike, Elephant Butte has stayed low. Snow is not the variable that decides whether this lake fills.³³
B. The four aligned years, in detail
Each year pairs the April-1 headwater snowpack (percent of median, source basins that feed this lake) with that same year's peak May–July storage at Elephant Butte.³³
Year | April-1 headwater snowpack (% of median) | Peak runoff-season storage | % of capacity |
2017 | Upper Rio Grande 113%, Upper San Juan 118%, Chama 141% | 503,238 AF | 25% |
2019 | ~125% runoff forecast; basins 120–140% | 565,485 AF | 28% |
2023 | Upper Rio Grande 138–140% | 570,686 AF | 28% |
2024 | Rio Grande headwaters 109%, San Juan 119%, statewide 122% | 459,887 AF | 23% |
Elephant Butte's total capacity is roughly 2.0 million acre-feet. Percent-of-capacity figures above use the peak daily storage reached during that year's May–July runoff window, computed from the TWDB daily record.
C. Salt cedar net-recovery math
The body carries a single number — roughly 37,500 to 45,000 acre-feet per year. Here is how it is built, and why it is deliberately conservative.¹¹
Step | Value | Basis |
Salt cedar consumptive use | ~4.2 AF/acre/yr | Published riparian-ET literature (NMT Decisionmakers; RiversEdge West / NISC) |
Native vegetation use (target) | ~2.8–3.3 AF/acre/yr | Same literature; native patchwork replacement |
Net recoverable per acre | ~1.5 AF/acre/yr | Net-recovery estimate from OpenET / field ET data; the defensible gain, net of continued native use |
Managed riparian acreage | 25,000–30,000 acres | San Acacia reach corridor estimate |
Net annual recovery | ~37,500–45,000 AF/yr | 1.5 AF/ac × 25,000–30,000 ac |
We count only the net difference, not gross consumption, and we do not print the commonly repeated one-to-two-million-acre-foot corridor figure, which cannot be tied to a public record. A USGS salvage counter-estimate as low as 0 to 1.5 AF/acre exists; even at the conservative end of our own range, the managed-reach case stands on the net figure above.¹², ¹³
SOURCES
Endnotes & primary sources
Every load-bearing figure above ties to a numbered source here. Links go to the primary document wherever one exists — the Supreme Court Special Master's report, Bureau of Reclamation, USGS, USDA, EIA, WAPA, the Federal Register, New Mexico statute, and legislative handouts. Where a figure could not be traced to a primary source, it is flagged in the text as unverified rather than cited here.
1. Elephant Butte storage 1.4% / ~27,073 AF as of Aug 10, 2026 (prior year 3.8% / 73,974 AF): Water Data for Texas (TWDB), Elephant Butte reservoir page.waterdatafortexas.org/reservoirs/individual/elephant-butte. “Lowest since the early 1970s” and dam-safety note: U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Aug 4, 2026.Reservoir operations & storage: usbr.gov/uc/water/hydrodata
2. Fourth Interim Report of the Special Master, Texas v. New Mexico & Colorado, No. 141 Orig. (Feb 6 2026), Appendix A: Consent Decree Supporting the Rio Grande Compact; final decree entered by U.S. Supreme Court May 26 2026. ca3.uscourts.gov/.../fourth_interim_report_020626.pdf
3. NMSU Arrowhead Center, New Mexico State Parks Impact Analysis FY2019–2024. arrowheadcenter.nmsu.edu/.../State-Parks-Impact-Analysis
4. NMSU Center for Border Economic Development, Economic Impact of Spaceport America 2019–2024 (Aug 2025). cbed.nmsu.edu/.../Spaceport-America-2019-2024
5. USDA NASS, 2024 New Mexico Agricultural Statistics; USDA NASS New Mexico Pecan County Estimates (May 2025) and 2024 New Mexico Chile Production report; NMSU College of ACES chile economic-contribution and acreage-decline data. 2024 NM Ag Statistics · NM Pecan County Estimates · NM 2024 Chile Production
6. USBR Power Office; NPS Elephant Butte Powerplant history. usbr.gov/uc/power · nps.gov/.../elephant-butte-powerplant
7. New Mexico Tech, Open-File Report OFR577, Water Supply Vulnerabilities (2015). geoinfo.nmt.edu/.../OFR577.pdf
8. Somach Simmons & Dunn / Texas Border Business, Texas–New Mexico settlement groundwater-reduction terms (18,200 AF/yr; half by May 26 2031). Somach Simmons & Dunn policy alert · texastribune.org/2025/08/29
9. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Elephant Butte Reservoir Five-Year Operational Plan Biological Assessment (Albuquerque Area Office, February 2009), §5.1.2, p. 21: Southwestern Willow Flycatcher habitat — “Water flooding the occupied sites is provided primarily by the outfall of the LFCC.”usbr.gov/uc/albuq/envdocs/bo/ebutte/EB-Ops.pdf
10. MRGCD / USFWS Middle Rio Grande Biological Opinion (2013). mrgcd.com/.../2013-0033_MRG_BiOp_Final.pdf
11. New Mexico Tech Decisionmakers Field Guide (riparian ET); RiversEdge West / National Invasive Species Council saltcedar consumptive-use literature. Reported salt cedar consumptive use spans roughly 3.5–4.2 AF/ac/yr; the ~4.2 AF/ac/yr figure used here is the upper bound, against a conservative ~2.8–3.3 AF/ac/yr native-vegetation target. The ~1.5 AF/ac/yr net-recovery figure used here is a net estimate drawn from OpenET / field ET data rather than gross consumptive use, and is kept deliberately modest. geoinfo.nmt.edu/.../decisionmakers
12. Lower San Acacia Reach Geomorphology & Alternatives Report, p.29 (USBR, Sept 2023) — LFCC design salvage estimate 37,000–46,000 AF/yr. LSARI Geomorphology & Alternatives Report (2023)
13. NM Legislature handout, “Moving Beyond the Low Flow Conveyance Channel” (WildEarth Guardians, Aug 2024) — caveat on 1950s–70s salvage estimates. nmlegis.gov/.../Low-Flow-Conveyance-Channel-WEG.pdf
14. LSARI EIS: Draft EIS Nov 28 2025; comment period closed Feb 11 2026; Final EIS & Record of Decision expected summer 2026; construction possible Dec 2026. virtualpublicmeeting.com/lsari-eis · EPA EIS #539445
15. Federal Register, Notice of Intent to prepare LSARI EIS (May 31 2023); MRGCD a cooperating agency. govinfo.gov/.../FR-2023-05-31 NOI
16. NM Legislature LFCC handout (Reclamation): O&M of LFCC transferred to MRGCD Aug 1 2021; title remains federal; changes to O&M require written U.S. authorization. nmlegis.gov/.../LFCC-BoR.pdf
17. Reclamation Act of 1902, §6 (32 Stat. 388–389): title to reserved Reclamation works “shall remain in the Government until otherwise provided by Congress.” Reclamation Act of 1902 (govinfo)
18. USBR River Mile 60 Controlled Outfall Draft EA/FONSI (Dec 2022); operating experimentally since Jan 2024. usbr.gov/.../RiverMile60-ControlledOutfall EA/FONSI
19. KVIA News, interview with LSARI project manager Ashlee Rudolph — benefit “tens of thousands more acre-feet” to Elephant Butte (Dec 24 2024). kvia.com/.../rio-grande-rechanneling-project
20. PL 93-493 §1401 (1974, San Juan–Chama / Middle Rio Grande) authorized a 50,000 AF recreation pool at Elephant Butte, established with San Juan–Chama water; the provision for the initial fill and up to 6,000 AF/yr of Heron releases to offset evaporation was limited to ten years and has expired, but the pool space itself was not repealed. Storage of purchased San Juan–Chama water at Elephant Butte for recreation and other beneficial purposes is authorized by PL 97-140 §5 (1981), 95 Stat. 1717 — the authority the City of Albuquerque used to contract for 50,000 AF of storage in 1983. Documented maximum San Juan–Chama storage at Elephant Butte is 50,000 AF (USBR Project data). PL 97-140, 95 Stat. 1717 · usbr.gov/projects (San Juan–Chama)
21. WildEarth Guardians, Abiquiu environmental pool (30,000 AF, established by settlement agreement, 2013). wildearthguardians.org/.../water-storage-space-secured
22. USBR Box Butte Operations Manual, Ch.5 (minimum fisheries pool by three-party operating agreement). usbr.gov/gp/nkao/box_butte/chap5.pdf
23. USBR Flaming Gorge DEIS Executive Summary (minimum releases via operating agreement); Cochiti recreation pool P.L. 88-293. usbr.gov/.../fgDEIS ExecSummary
24. Federal Water Project Recreation Act, P.L. 89-72 (1965). govinfo.gov/.../COMPS-2974.pdf
25. USGS FISC Padilla/Young sedimentation study; USBR Five-Year Operational Plan — >600,000 AF (~23%) of Elephant Butte capacity lost to sediment since 1916. pubs.usgs.gov/.../Poster_PadillaYoung.pdf
26. WAPA SLCA/IP Statistical Appendix FY2022; Hydropower Reform Coalition, Elephant Butte (generation, capacity factor). wapa.gov/.../22-StatisticalAppendix-SLCA.pdf · hydroreform.org/.../elephant-butte
27. WAPA-206 brochure (Jan 2024) rates; EIA Electric Power Monthly Table 5.6.A (retail rates). wapa.gov/.../wapa-206-brochure · eia.gov/electricity/monthly
28. NMSA §62-16-3, §62-16-4 (Energy Transition Act: zero-carbon resource definition & 2045 target); Clean Air Task Force NM Clean Energy Standard analysis (Dec 2025). NMSA §62-16-4
29. NM Legislature Water Supply Vulnerabilities briefing (Dec 2014) — cumulative groundwater depletion ~2.5M AF. nmlegis.gov/.../Water-Supply-Vulnerabilities
30. MRGEDA Sierra County study (2022) — quality of life as recruitment factor; Architectural League, Sierra County water scarcity. mrgeda.com/.../FinalReport_SierraCounty.pdf
31. MRGCD FAQs 2025 — Middle Rio Grande Pueblos “Prior and Paramount” rights; USBR Bipartisan Infrastructure Law equity criteria. mrgcd.com/.../MRGCD-FAQs-2025.pdf
32. Sierra County minimum-pool estimate. The Sierra County, New Mexico Comprehensive Plan (2017), adopted by the Sierra County Board of Commissioners, states (p. 46, §4.5.1): “What minimum pool is needed? Based on historical data, and insight from wildlife enthusiasts, as well as affected business owners, it is estimated that a minimum pool of 180,000 and 200,000 acre-feet of water is necessary.” This is a county-adopted planning figure reflecting historical data and stakeholder input, not an engineering threshold. Sierra County Comprehensive Plan (2017), p. 46
33. Headwater snowpack vs. lake fill (chart). April-1 snow-water-equivalent, percent of median, for the Upper Rio Grande, San Juan, and Rio Chama headwater basins: NRCS New Mexico & Colorado Water Supply Outlook Reports (2017, 2019, 2023, 2024) and NOAA Climate Prediction Center (Gutzler, April 2017); USACE 2019 Report to the Rio Grande Compact Commission. Elephant Butte peak runoff-season (May–July) storage computed from Water Data for Texas (TWDB) daily reservoir records, period of record from 1915. NRCS NM WSOR Apr-1-2024 · NOAA CPC (Gutzler 2017) · Water Data for Texas
34. Elephant Butte evaporation. Total capacity ~2.0 million AF (2,023,358 AF), USBR Elephant Butte Five-Year Operational Plan. Evaporative depth up to ~10 ft/yr; full-lake loss ~140,000 AF/yr; typical-year loss ~100,000 AF/yr (greater than the City of Albuquerque's ~50,000 AF/yr municipal use): Utton Center, “New Mexico's Major Reservoirs”; New Mexico Water Education, Rio Grande Compact fact sheet. Recent coupled WRF/WRF-Lake modeling estimates ~172,000–177,000 AF/yr: USBR WaterSMART Applied Science. Evaporation is a surface phenomenon (loss = rate × exposed surface area): Central Water Commission, “Evaporation Control in Reservoirs.” Evaporation from Elephant Butte counts against New Mexico's Rio Grande Compact allocation. Utton Center reservoirs · NM Water Education · USBR WaterSMART evaporation study
35. Elephant Butte hydropower and year-round generation. Three ~8,100 kW generators; water released for power generation at Elephant Butte is recaptured 25 miles downstream at Caballo Dam and stored for irrigation, enabling year-round generation — a designed flow-through system. National Park Service, Elephant Butte Powerplant; USBR Rio Grande Project; New Mexico Bureau of Geology & Mineral Resources. NPS Elephant Butte Powerplant · USBR Rio Grande Project
36. Water-level fluctuation and fish spawning. Nest-spawning species such as largemouth bass show a clear preference for stable reservoir water levels; falling levels during the spawn expose nests to air and kill the eggs, impairing reproductive success. Strong largemouth year-classes occur when levels are at or over pool during spring and summer; hatching success is highest when levels are stable and is disrupted by rapid rises and drops. Documented harms include stranding eggs, forcing adults to abandon nests, and increased predation. Neotropical Ichthyology (SciELO) · SEAFWA (Neal) · N. Am. J. Fisheries Mgmt · Reservoir Fish Habitat Mgmt manual
37. State fishery management at Elephant Butte. New Mexico Game & Fish uses voluntary off-limits spawning coves in May and June and has worked with the Bureau of Reclamation to minimize the impact of water releases during the spawn; the State continues to invest in the fishery, stocking roughly one million largemouth bass fry over two days in May 2026 and releasing 1,300+ adult bass in an August 2025 community event, funded by license revenue. Bassmaster (B.A.S.S.) · Las Cruces Digest / NMDGF
38. Storage decline, recreation closures, and county economics. Elephant Butte fell to about 1.4% of capacity (~27,000 acre-feet) in August 2026, its lowest level since 1971. New Mexico State Parks closed the main Elephant Butte boat ramp on August 5, 2026, with South Monticello and Rock Canyon also closed, and waived all camping fees Aug. 1–Sept. 30. State Rep. Rebecca Dow called it “an economic catastrophe for my community… also an environmental catastrophe.” The Mayor of Elephant Butte reported fewer tourists and weekend homeowners leaving for other lakes, with the loss falling on gross-receipts tax; a Truth or Consequences hotel reported dropping from routinely selling out to about 50% occupancy. Recreational fishing contributes roughly $267 million in activity and about 3,136 jobs statewide. End-of-August storage series: 2021 5.0%, 2022 4.8%, 2023 19.6%, 2024 8.0% (TWDB end-August Total Storage); 2025 3.8% and 2026 1.4% (Water Data for Texas). The Mayor is separately pursuing emergency relief funds for local small businesses (direct communication to the author). NM State Parks (EMNRD) · Albuquerque Journal (fee waiver) · KRQE (Rep. Dow) · AP News (Mayor Holcomb) · TWDB Texas Water Conditions · Water Data for Texas · NMDGF economic-impact study
39. Rainfall, snowpack, and lake storage, 2021–2025 (chart and text). New Mexico statewide precipitation as percent of the 1991–2020 normal: NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, Climate at a Glance, statewide time series (2023 = 79%, the 18th-driest year in the 1895–present record; 2024 = 93%). Headwater snow-water-equivalent as percent of median (April 1) for the Rio Grande Headwaters basin: NRCS Water Supply Outlook Reports. Elephant Butte year-end storage as percent of capacity, and the 2023 doubling (~225,000 to ~466,000 AF) and 2024 decline (to ~186,000 AF): Water Data for Texas (TWDB) daily reservoir records. 2023 “18th-driest” and annual-climate summary: NWS Albuquerque 2023 Annual Climate Summary. NOAA NCEI Climate at a Glance · NWS Albuquerque 2023 Annual Climate · NRCS NM WSOR Apr-1-2024 · Water Data for Texas
40. Article VII storage restriction and the 2026 settlement. Under Article VII of the Rio Grande Compact (1938), New Mexico may not increase the amount of Rio Grande water held in post-1929 storage above Elephant Butte whenever usable Project storage in Elephant Butte and Caballo is below 400,000 acre-feet. New Mexico’s accrued Compact debit stood at roughly 124,000 acre-feet as of January 1, 2025 (accrued debit for calendar year 2024, 121,500 acre-feet); the Engineer Advisers report that “New Mexico was unable to retain debit water in 2024.” Article VII restrictions were not in effect January 1–June 24, 2024, and were in effect June 25–December 31, 2024, when usable Project storage fell below the 400,000-acre-foot trigger: Report of the Engineer Advisers to the Rio Grande Compact Commission (2025). The May 2026 Consent Decree in Texas v. New Mexico & Colorado settles apportionment below Elephant Butte and Lower Rio Grande groundwater; it does not amend Article VII or the 400,000-AF trigger, and states expressly that it “does not alter the Compact rights and obligations of the signatory States.” Fourth Interim Report of the Special Master (Feb 6 2026); Office of the Governor of New Mexico (May 28 2026). 2025 Report of the Engineer Advisers · Special Master Fourth Interim Report · NM Governor’s Office
41. Reclamation confirms the 1974 pool space still exists. The Elephant Butte Five-Year Operational Plan states: “The minimum recreational pool space still exists, and legally, a SJ-C contractor could still move its water to the pool.” It also explains that although “the law’s provision for the initial 50,000 acre-feet of SJ-C water to be released to establish the pool, and up to 6,000 acre-feet annually thereafter for evaporation losses, for a period of ten years, has expired, the space for the pool itself has not.” San Juan–Chama water stored in Elephant Butte is classified as “non-Project Storage” for Rio Grande Compact accounting — it is excluded from the Article VII Project-Storage total and is the first water to spill in a spill year. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Elephant Butte Reservoir Five-Year Operational Plan (pp. 7, 48–50). usbr.gov/uc/albuq/envdocs/bo/ebutte/EB-Ops.pdf
42. The Rio Grande below Elephant Butte and Caballo dams runs dry outside the irrigation-release window. Reclamation’s Rio Grande Basin report states that below Elephant Butte the river “only flows during irrigation water deliveries from the Rio Grande Project or in rare floods,” and its release announcements warn that “the dry riverbed below both Elephant Butte and Caballo dams will take on water quickly” when releases resume. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Rio Grande Basin SECURE Report (2021); Reclamation Newsroom release. usbr.gov/.../RioGrandeBasin.pdf · usbr.gov/newsroom/news-release/5325
43. Temporary in-channel dams are placed below Elephant Butte to hold water in the reach between releases. Reclamation notes that to facilitate a release, “the temporary dam at Rotary Park will be removed … and will be rebuilt within three business days following the conclusion of releases from Elephant Butte.” U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Newsroom release. usbr.gov/newsroom/news-release/5219
44. New Mexico State Investment Council holdings. The SIC reported assets under management of $64.0 billion as of June 30, 2025, and by July 2026 SIC leaders told legislators the permanent funds had reached nearly $75 billion, second only to Alaska among U.S. state funds. New Mexico State Investment Council update to the Investments and Pensions Oversight Committee (Aug 2025); testimony reported July 2026. nmlegis.gov SIC update (Aug 2025) · SIC July 2026 testimony
45. Completed monsoon-operations environmental assessment. District and Reclamation officials confirmed on-site during the San Acacia field tour (July 30, 2026) that the environmental assessment authorizing monsoon-flow operations in the reach has been completed — distinct from, and ahead of, the larger LSARI realignment EIS. Author field recordings, San Acacia Reach tour (July 30, 2026). This authorization allows operation of the reach for monsoon capture ahead of the realignment Record of Decision.
46. New Mexico Strategic Water Reserve and San Juan–Chama leasing. The Strategic Water Reserve (NMSA 1978 §72-14-3.3, enacted 2005; amended by S.B. 37, 2025) authorizes the Interstate Stream Commission to purchase or lease water from willing sellers to help the State meet interstate-compact obligations and benefit threatened or endangered species; the 2025 amendment allows the Commission to prioritize transactions that provide supplementary recreational benefits. The State’s 2022 budget included $500,000 to lease 20,000 acre-feet from the Jicarilla Apache Nation for the Reserve. A full San Juan–Chama allocation (firm yield 96,200 AF) has been available in only three of the last ten years (2017, 2019, 2023). N.M. Office of the State Engineer / Interstate Stream Commission; Think New Mexico; USBR Calendar Year 2024 Report to the Rio Grande Compact Commission. OSE Strategic Water Reserve · Think New Mexico · USBR 2024 Compact Report
47. Low Flow Conveyance Channel design capacity. The LFCC was completed in 1959 with a nominal design capacity of 2,000 cubic feet per second; in practice, diversions greater than 1,800 cfs have rarely occurred, and the maximum recorded diversion at San Acacia is 1,950 cfs. C. Gorbach, “The Low-Flow Conveyance Channel,” New Mexico Water Resources Research Institute (WRRI) Conference (1999).
Additional primary sources consulted (background, not tied to a specific figure above): 4 — NMSU Center for Border Economic Development, Spaceport America economic impact; 7 — New Mexico Tech OFR577, Water Supply Vulnerabilities; 10 — MRGCD/USFWS Middle Rio Grande Biological Opinion (2013); 14 — LSARI EIS schedule (Draft EIS, comment period, and Final EIS/Record of Decision timeline); 15 — Federal Register Notice of Intent to prepare the LSARI EIS (MRGCD a cooperating agency); 27 — WAPA-206 and EIA retail-rate references; 29 — NM Legislature Water Supply Vulnerabilities briefing (cumulative groundwater depletion); 30 — MRGEDA Sierra County study and Architectural League on Sierra County water scarcity; 31 — MRGCD Middle Rio Grande Pueblo “Prior and Paramount” rights and USBR infrastructure-equity criteria.
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